In the late 1990s a separatist movement emerged in Namibia's northeastern Caprivi Region. Its supporters' declared goal was to rid what they considered as "their country" from a perceived "foreign" domination by "Ovambos", the core support base of Namibia's SWAPO government. In the aftermath of an armed uprising in 1999 speculation emerged regarding a possible link between the Caprivi secessionists and Lozi separatists across the border in Zambia's Western Province. The Caprivi panhandle was created by the Anglo-German "Heligoland-Zanzibar Agreement" which partitioned the Lozi kingdom in 1890. The Lozi heritage certainly has continuing relevance for Caprivi's population. Through language, kinship relations and economic exchange it serves as an integrative factor of everyday life in the Namibia/Zambia borderland. It does, however, not take the form of political self-identification. I argue that the Caprivi secessionists had no intentions of re-creating a united Lozi kingdom. The present-day positions of authority by the "traditional" leaders of the Fwe (the support base of the secessionists) and other groups in Caprivi were, in fact, created by the territorial separation and system of indirect rule imposed by the German colonial authorities. Thus, the colonial border served vested interests in Caprivi from the outset. Rather than reverting to an imagined pre-colonial past, the secessionists' territorial claim emerged from a more recent legacy of pre-independence state formation: The apartheid regime's attempt to create a Caprivi Bantustan. As in the case of the colonial boundary, this legacy caused new political realities and vested interests to emerge on the ground in Caprivi. The separatists now appear to be a spent force and secessionism in Caprivi is "out". Instead, transnational investment is "in", especially since the completion of a road link from the sea port Walvis Bay to the Copper Belt in 2004. Informal cross-border business ventures in the Namibia/Zambia borderland are flourishing in the shadows of the boom which accompanies the new transport route. The border is once again at the center of vested interests of those who live in its proximity. To call this border "arbitrary" or "artificial" therefore neglects the fact that in nearly 12 decades it has very much become part of the socioeconomic and political landscape of Caprivi. If the border and its borderland are "dangerous" for the Namibian state is a different question, however. The paper is based on 10 months of ethnographic field work carried out in the Caprivi Region and Zambia's Western Province in 2002 and, as well as archival material and evidence emerging from the Caprivi high treason trials in Namibia. This is an author final version, known as a postprint.
Introduction
Due to geographical distance and difficult road access Namibia's Caprivi Region and Zambia's Western Province have been, until recently, poorly connected to the two countries' capital centers of Windhoek and Lusaka. Their peripheral location was reflected in their political status a well. Separatist movements emerged in both areas, which share a cultural heritage that originates from the time before the colonial boundary was imposed. The powerful pre-colonial Lozi kingdom was partitioned in 1890 by the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty between Britain and Germany. 1 The agreement, concluded in the later years of the Scramble for Africa, sealed a swap of territories in eastern Africa and off the German North Sea coast.
With the Caprivi Strip it also established one of the most recognizable legacies of colonial boundary-drawing on the political map of Africa. In the spirit of the time 2 , the so-called "access corridor to the Zambezi" (Anglo-German agreement of 1890, Article III. 2.) was motivated by German hopes for a direct land connection from the existing protectorate of Deutsch Südwest Afrika (DSWA) to the interior of Southern Africa and the German territories in East Africa. Today the colonial boundary created by the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty separates Namibia from Zambia. But the close personal ties among the borderland population have endured. Through language, kinship relations and economic exchange the Lozi heritage continues to serve as an integrative factor of everyday life in the Namibia-Zambia borderland.
The legacy behind the Caprivi panhandle's odd cartographic shape and present-day sociopolitical realities in the borderland would seem to sustain a two-pronged proposition widely associated with African boundaries: Firstly, the Namibia-Zambia boundary was drawn arbitrarily to exclusively serve European strategic interests in Africa, at the expense of the indigenous population of the borderland which it created. Secondly, the boundary to this day artificially separates a people who essentially belong together, rather than to the respective nation-states which claim them as their citizens, but with whose central governments they feel at odds. In this article, I will present the cases of the historical creation and present-day role of two chieftaincies from the Namibia-Zambia borderland as a way to puncture these sweeping propositions. As a point of departure I do not consider Africa's borders as inanimate structures, or their borderlands merely as passive peripheries which, as Herbst argues, present a problem for the colonial and postcolonial central state in Africa. According to Herbst, colonial boundary-drawing in Africa has created territorial voids into which postcolonial state authority strives to broadcast its power, but fails due to various challenging factors like low population density, overall geographic size and terrain, and the location of the capital city (Herbst 2000) . My emphasis is instead on what Das and Poole describe as the agency and "creativity of the margins" of the state (Das and Poole 2004, 19) . These margins are sites and * Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh | wolfgang.zeller@ed.ac.uk everyday situations where people and the frontline representatives of the state engage each other. In these engagements the former are not simply passive recipients of central state power, while the role of the latter becomes blurred by the presence of what Lund (2006) calls "twilight institutions". The actions of both routinely transcend an imagined separation of state versus non-state. As in other borderlands around the world the presence of colonial African boundaries has over time become a central economic and at times political factor directing the movement of goods and people (Asiwaju 1976; Miles 1994; Flynn 1997; Nugent 2002; Englund 2002; Chalfin 2001; Kreike 2004; Niger-Thomas 2001) . Smugglers and others living off the opportunities created by the border conduct their business in ways that are often officially illegal, but widely considered as licit by those engaged in them (Schendel and Abraham 2005 ; see also Roitman 2001, 218) . Long-term and in-depth empirical work carried out on African borderlands in recent years suggests that in many cases the continent's boundaries have become deeply embedded in the vested interests of those residing in borderlands, and that this can be observed from the time of their formal creation during European colonialism. Nugent, for example, argues that during the colonial period the Togo-Ghana border was reinforced on a daily basis by people living alongside it, but often in apparent opposition to the formal laws regulating it (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996, 36; ; see also Miles 1994) .
In this article my foremost concern is not with the opportunities offered by the Namibia-Zambia border for smugglers and other borderland entrepreneurs (compare Zeller 2007a; Zeller forthcoming), but with another legacy closely associated with the process of colonial boundary-drawing. So-called "chiefs", "headmen" or "traditional leaders" played a fundamental role in state formation in colonial Africa. In their quest to create spatially and socially stable societies at minimum administrative cost Europeans incorporated, changed or invented chieftaincies (Mamdani 1996) 3 .This legacy continues to have important implications for the nature of state authority in the African postcolony today. Several authors have recently noted a marked resurgence in the role of chiefs in countries across Africa (Oomen 2000 (Oomen , 2005 Friedman 2005; Koelble 2005; Kyed 2005, 2007; Kyed 2008; Englebert 2002 Englebert , 2005 . African governments increasingly delegate formal tasks to chiefs, who in turn are actively appropriating new roles for themselves in local, regional and national government.
Their ability to claim legitimacy through authentic links with the people at the "grassroots" gives them special leverage over those who represent postcolonial state power. nature of African boundaries as a root cause of state failure suggests that redrawing these boundaries could be a fix for the supposed ungovernability of African societies. The origin and nature of African boundaries is of course a deeply problematic legacy for postcolonial state formation on the continent. But that is not the entire story. Over nearly 12 decades the Namibia-Zambia border has become an integral part of the socioeconomic and political landscape of the borderland. And some of the opportunities and vested interests associated with the border today were part and parcel of its creation from the start. I argue my case through the history of two chieftaincies on either side of the Namibia-Zambia borderland. I demonstrate that these peripheral actors have a long history of creatively engaging colonial and postcolonial state authority from the margins, and on their own terms. Colonial boundary drawing and the separation of subject people were therefore not just externally imposed, but a process of mutual engagement. The relevance of this engagement and transformation continues today, as the chiefs who represent these interests are still -and even increasinglywell-connected power brokers for the representatives of central state power in the postcolony.
Apart from that, the chiefs are also actively engaging other powerful players than their own governments.
In the following sections I first introduce the early encounter of European colonizers and the Lozi leadership along the Upper Zambezi in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The article continues with a fast-forward through regional history to the time of Zambian and Namibian independence, and the emergence of separatist tendencies on both sides of the borderland. The final section takes a closer look at the mutual engagement of the state, business investors and the two chieftaincies in the present, followed by some general conclusions.
Mutual Engagement: Colonial Intrusion and Chiefs on the Upper Zambezi

British and Lozi Interests and the Sesheke Chieftaincy
Two decisions relevant to the creation of the Namibia-Zambia border were made in 1890. On June 27 the Lochner Concession was signed by Lozi King Lewanika and Frank Lochner, an agent of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). Six years earlier Lewanika had vigorously asserted his position against competing forces within the kingdom. His reign brought stability after decades of external invasion and internal strife had rendered Bulozi (the Lozi kingdom) weakened and disorganized. Lewanika was, however, aware of old and new rising threats. The powerful Ndebele and Tonga groups had repeatedly raided Bulozi's fringes and the leaders of the Subiya in Sesheke province showed ambitions to increase their autonomy (compare Shamukuni 1972) . A crucial aspect of Lewanika's project of Lozi state formation was therefore the appointment of trusted representatives to secure control over the kingdom's most volatile frontier: Bulozi's southern provinces Linyanti and Sesheke -the area which today is the Namibia/Zambia borderland (Flint 2003, 402, 406; Mainga 1973, 132f.) .
Lewanika confirmed Simataa Kabende Mamili, a trusted old ally, as chief of Linyanti. At Sesheke, Lewanika created a senior chieftaincy, to which he appointed his son and later successor Litia in 1893. Livingstone, the regional hub of British colonial intrusion at the time, is located 130 kilometers downstream from Sesheke, which emerged as a gateway for Bulozi's engagement of the whites (Flint 2003, 410) . The European contacts were promising access to education in western skills and trade in foreign goods, including firearms. Aware of the gradual expansion of the Portuguese and Germans into fringe areas of the kingdom Lewanika in 1890 decided to follow the counsel of his confidante French missionary Fancois Coillard and invited the protection of the British crown for Bulozi (Caplan 1969) . 4 The Lochner
Concession and several follow-up contracts guaranteed the Lozis a large degree of autonomy in administration and taxation (Mainga Bull 1995, 5) , a regular salary for Lewanika and the delivery of education and other western services. Lozis today still regard Lewanika's alliance with the British as a mature decision, which provided a degree of internal stability Bulozi had not seen in the 19 th century (Flint 2004, 119) . Lewanika had however entered into an irreversible process, gradually trading the kingdom's sovereignty for political-military and material protection by the British (Mainga 1973, 171) . When BSAC troops defeated the Ndebele in 1893 the Lozis were reassured that they had a powerful, but possibly dangerous ally.
On 1 July 1890, four days after the Lochner Concession, the British and German governments signed the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. This was followed in 1891 and 1893 by Anglo-Portuguese deals staking out European territorial interests in western Bulozi. News about these contracts, which de facto truncated Lozi territory, only filtered through to Lewanika in 1895.
He had reasons to doubt the integrity of his British allies, but knew he was in no longer in a position to exit the relationship. To the British High Commissioner and the Queen, Lewanika wrote in October 1896: "I would like your government to rule all my country and to save my people. I do not wish my country to be divided into two parts between Portugal and Germany.
It must be in one part under England" (quoted in Mainga 1973, 193) . The losses of territory were significant for the Lozi leadership. The power center of the kingdom relied heavily on tribute it extracted through trade and coercion from the forested hinterlands. For senior chief Letia at Sesheke the Caprivi Strip was a rich hunting and fishing ground. It also provided dry season pasture, construction materials, labor and women from the Subiya and other subject people in the area. Lewanika's letter and several follow-ups remain unanswered, but the treaties signed in Europe had no immediate impact on the ground. The Portuguese and Germans made little effort to become active in Bulozi. Letia at Sesheke continued to extract tribute from his subject people across the Zambezi in what European maps now represented as German territory.
The slow but steady process of change brought on by BSAC administrators, white traders and missionaries on the upper Zambezi accelerated soon after 1900. In 1903 BSAC divided Barotseland into five districts, one of which became Sesheke -the emerging regional hub for commerce and administration. Resident District Commissioners were commanding an armed native police force of altogether 600 men. In the following years they formally abolished slavery and imposed a hut tax of ten shilling per annum. This caused considerable upset among the Lozi elites. Yet Lewanika's rule was already heavily dependent on his white counterpart's material and political support. His internal opponents were sufficiently intimidated and remunerated to refrain from open rebellion (Caplan 1970, 91) . Lewanika received a ten per cent share of the revenue, part of which would trickle down to lower-level chiefs like Litia. Through rigorous coercion by the BSAC in close cooperation with the Lozi leadership in all districts the overall hut tax revenue in Barotseland reached £33,000 by 1907 (Caplan 1970, 86f.) . The material base of the Lozi elites thus shifted from direct extraction of tribute and labor to monetary income distributed to them by the British authorities. They gradually adopted the luxuries and etiquette of a European lifestyle while high-born Lozi youths were educated in missionary schools and groomed to take their place in the Lozi bureaucracy (Mainga 1973, 206) . Lewanika himself was at the forefront of the increasing selfidentification of Lozi royalty as members of Britain's imperial aristocracy (compare Parsons 1998). The common Lozi people had to find sources to earn cash income. By the early 1910s thousands of Lozi men were migrating every year to work in the mines and commercial farms and on the lines of rail in the Rhodesias and South Africa (Van Horn 1977; Gluckman 1941) .
In 1911 BSAC established the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. The so-called Barotseland Province was given a high degree of autonomy, but was kept as a deliberately undeveloped native labor reserve. After Lewanika's death in 1916 his son Letia, under the title Yeta III, assumed the Lozi throne. Following the German loss of Caprivi at the outbreak of did manage to secure a special arrangement which enabled his subjects to make continued use of selected natural resources across the border. Royal hunting parties received special permissions to visit Caprivi and certain river islands and backwaters were designated for fishing and harvesting of construction material for the royal palace at Sesheke. These so-called "Barotse Privileges" were in place until Zambian independence in 1964 (Hangula 1993, 71) .
In retrospect, the British in 1890 clearly misled Lewanika to believe that his autonomy and the territorial extent of his power would be preserved. On the other hand, the Lozi-British engagement consolidated the power of Lewanika, thereby resulting in increased political stability for the heartland of Bulozi and considerable material wealth for its ruling elites. For Letia his chieftaincy at Sesheke provided a solid economic and political base from which to learn the craft of the statesman who later assumed the Lozi leadership. Lewanika and Letia were therefore not only passive recipients of the power projected outward by the British colonial system. They were able to creatively engage with the British colonizers for their own personal advantage and that of the inner circles of Lozi power. And for nearly two decades, the loss of Lozi territory, sealed by the 1890 Anglo-German treaty, had in fact no significant impact on the ground.
Raising the Kaiser's Flag at the Zambezi -the Schuckmannsburg Chieftaincy
The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty inspired German dreams of a cross-continental transport link.
DSWA also needed water and labor resources, which seemed available in great abundance via the access corridor. Reality soon grounded such colonial fantasies. Reaching the Zambezi from the established German outposts proved much more difficult than anticipated in 1890. In the colony and the Reich the value of the unproductive backwater on the Zambezi was openly questioned (Allgemeine Zeitung 1907-08). From 1905 however the aggressive military and political expansionism of Kaiser Wilhelm II led to a more vigorous exploration of the overseas territories for raw materials production and trade (Sandner and Rössler 1994, 118) . German interest in the access corridor to the Zambezi was rekindled and more reliable scientific data was in great demand. 5 After the extermination war against the Herero and Nama (1904-08) German settlement surged and diamond deposits were discovered near Lüderitzbucht. The colony urgently needed to increase its indigenous labor force. The colonial lobby's publications and newspapers in DSWA also speculated over possible mineral deposits in Caprivi (Seiner 1909; Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1907, 25, 73 After an arduous three-month journey through the Kalahari by Hauptmann Kurt Streitwolf, three white and fourteen black troops, the German flag was hoisted in February 1909 at a place the German resident named "Schuckmannsburg". It was located just across the Zambezi from Sesheke. According to his own by no means impartial accounts, Streitwolf encountered little resistance in his campaign to police the German territory. To his superiors he also reported that Caprivi had no convincing traces of valuable minerals, a dangerous climate for European settlement and a moderate potential as a labor reserve, mainly restricted by the difficult transport access (Streitwolf 1911, 229-234 ). Streitwolf's most delicate task was the setting up of a functioning administration with minimal resources in a large remote territory. His strategy from the outset was to find a working relationship with the natives and his British colleagues based on careful negotiation (Streitwolf 1911, 22-28) . The German resident however encountered a major obstacle: Upon his arrival at Schuckmannsburg, Streitwolf discovered that the German side of the borderland near the Zambezi was nearly unpopulated. Prior to his arrival, the Subiya people from the area had largely relocated onto British territory. Streitwolf alleged that chief Litia had, through persuasive and coercive force, urged them to move across the Zambezi with their livestock. 7 After three months of negotiations with Letia and his British counterparts Streitwolf was able to partially reverse the exodus of Subiya from German territory. In early May 1909 several hundred Subiya convened at Schuckmannsburg for a meeting called by the resident. Streitwolf reported that the Subiyas' initial reluctance to return and follow his suggestions to select a chief subsided after he managed to convince them that their separation from Letia's rule would be definite: They were now under the protection of the German Kaiser, and no longer required to deliver slave labor, tribute or taxes (Streitwolf 1911, 110 successful outcome in this matter as decisive for the "psychological" separation of the population in Caprivi from their Lozi overlords and their recognition of German sovereignty.
The lengthy trial process was eventually concluded in August 1909 after direct intervention by the BSAC's senior administrator in Livingstone. Of 486 disputed cattle 291 were released by Letia and returned across the Zambezi (Streitwolf 1911, 112; compare also Flint 2003, 410ff) .
The significance of this event needs to be considered cautiously and in view of the fact that the other results of German colonial rule in Caprivi are rather modest. During their five year presence the German administration operated on an absolute minimum of financial input, manpower and infrastructure. A very small native police force was trained, but the Germans did not attempt to collect taxes in the territory. The latter was most likely motivated both by the hope to attract more migrants from the British territories, as well as the relative inability of the Germans to administer and enforce their collection. Streitwolf's emphasis on the significance of the cattle trial's outcome as a litmus test for the German ability to govern Caprivi seems justified, however. When discussing the German legacy with present-day inhabitants of Caprivi they never fail to stress: "Those Germans gave us our cattle back" (Mubusisi 2002 , Munihango 1996 . As Flint notes, the affirmation of the Fwe chieftaincy and the creation of the Subiya chieftaincy, backed up by the cattle trial clearly broke the existing chain of command and allegiance between the previously subordinate peoples in Caprivi and their Lozi overlords. These events were therefore decisive in the affirmation of the partitioning of Bulozi along the colonial boundary and its transition from a mere line on maps to a fact of daily life in the borderland. Chiefs Chikamatondo and Mamili had seized the opportunity to safely dissociate themselves from Lozi rule, and to gain considerable material advantages at the same time. For Letia this outcome was naturally a setback in his efforts to creatively engage the colonizers on his own terms. However, considering his BSAC tax revenues and the arrangement of the Barotse Privileges, his loss was by no means absolute. (Mainga Bull 1996, 12) .
From Colonial Labor Reserves to Post-Independence Separatism
The consequences became apparent soon after Zambia gained independence on 24 October 1964. The UNIP government hardly concealed the fact that they intended to do away with what they regarded as a colonial anachronism incompatible with their vision of African socialism (Caplan 1968, 356) The Caprivi Strip began to play an important role in South Africa's strategy to block the perceived encroachment of hostile governments and guerrilla movements. The former access corridor transformed into a forward position for cross-border raids by both sides. Namibian independence finally arrived in 1990. Amid high expectations for fast development the impoverished majority population elected the SWAPO party to power with an overwhelming majority in most regions, but not in Caprivi. Rivalries between the two existing chieftaincies became entangled with the political legacy of SWAPO's years as a guerilla movement. The Fwe leadership supported the main opposition party DTA while Subiya generally supported SWAPO. Government's recognition of a Fwe breakaway-chieftaincy contributed to a gradual process of radicalization. On 2 August 1999 armed militants launched attacks on Namibian government installations in Caprivi, resulting in fifteen casualties and a three-week long state of emergency. The secessionist movement now appears to be a spent force. Their leadership is largely dead, on trial for high treason or in exile 10 . What remains is the SWAPO government's experience of Caprivi as a potential threat to Namibia's territorial sovereignty, its keen interest to spread the official version of liberation history as a unified struggle, and its promises of broad socio-economic development in the region.
A New Deal? The Re-engagement of Governments and Borderland Chiefs in the 21 st
Century
For their own specific reasons, the two governments have re-discovered chiefs in the borderland as interlocutors to bridge the gap between politically volatile hinterlands and the centers of state power. Key to the usefulness of the chiefs is the continued support they enjoy among their subjects. The same institution which used to ensure the supply of tax revenue and native labor is now supplying voters. Yet the chiefs' ability to mobilize "their people" also depends on their ability to show tangible results in a situation of dire scarcity of resources.
While direct access to the higher levels of government is conducive to "bringing development", a closer look at recent events in the borderland reveals that by-passing government and making direct links with investors is becoming an attractive option which some chiefs are pursuing in parallel. As in other rural parts of Zambia, the already sparse road Province. MMD has actively courted the Lozi leadership and their subjects' votes and channeled significant development projects into the area. This has yielded results. In party did not do well in Western Province. But now I have an impression that the MMD is becoming stronger than ever. Come next elections, we will scoop all the seats in Western Province" (The Post, December 7, 2004) . 13 Apart from its political potential, Western Province is also attracting growing economic interests. The region is relatively wealthy in natural resources 14 and the end of the civil war in Angola in 2002 has raised hopes for political stability the wider region had not seen in decades. Following a personal initiative of chief Yeta, the Zambian government agreed to asphalt the feeder road leading to Mwandi (Sandema 2004; Yeta 2004) . Chief Yeta is nonetheless cautious regarding the long-term reliability of his access route to the highest halls of government power: "That does not necessarily mean that there is recognition of the institution that I represent. The minute you get a chief who is not in good books with President Mwanawasa, the President will be justified in just ignoring the Royal Establishment and say: 'Oh no, those people there, we don't have any time for them'" The floods mainly affected the Subiya-inhabited areas where SWAPO has its bedrock support in the region.
The relationship of chiefs in Namibia and the SWAPO party has a long, but not straightforward history. During the liberation struggle SWAPO denounced chiefs as traitors who collaborated with the white minority regime working against an oppressed black working class. In the run-up to independence, SWAPO quickly shed much of their socialist rhetoric and participated in the drafting of a constitution which laid the legal foundation for the present role of traditional authorities in Namibia. Several acts of parliament passed since independence have further entrenched the participation of chiefs in the day-to-day governance of Namibia's rural areas. Their official functions now go well beyond acting as "custodians of inherited culture and tradition" in a hazily defined realm of custom (Tötemeyer 2000:132) . The Council of Traditional Leaders Act of 1997 (section 2) established a high-profile public platform for chiefs to "advise" the President on policy issues. The Traditional Authorities Act of 2000 section 3(1) provides for the reimbursement of chiefs and their advisors through public funds.
It also ascribes members of traditional authorities the role to "assist the Namibian police in the prevention and investigation of crime" (section 3(2)). The Community Courts Act of 2003 formalized the roles and procedures of village tribunals headed by chiefs. Communal land is now managed by land boards which have formalized existing practices of chiefs giving land title deeds. State legislators in Namibia often acknowledge the role of chiefs as one of wise parents whose advise is valued as a direct link to the "traditions" of a primordial past, pure from the corruption of European and other external influences. This depoliticized language mirrors that employed by Namibian chiefs, who frequently refer to members of the government in apparently neutral terms as "our sons," whom they expect to pay respect to their elders. The practice and official recognition of traditional authorities in Namibia is, however, a field fraught with political tension as the case of the breakaway Fwe chieftaincies shows (compare also Friedman 2005) .
Subiya Chief Kisco Liswani III plays a key role in this mutual engagement of SWAPO and traditional leaders. With reference to the politics of his Fwe rivals he declares: "We cannot involve ourselves in that secessionist activity. We are the stronghold of the SWAPO party in the region." Chief Liswani's personal background illustrates the continuing strength of kinship ties across the Namibia-Zambia boundary. His father, a member of the Subiya's royal family clan spent most of his adult life in Northern Rhodesia while his mother is a Subiya from Schuckmannsburg. Following the death of Chief Muraliswani in 1996 the current chief was called to take the royal throne at the town Bukalo. Chief Liswani recalls overcoming the initial shock over the end of his career in the Namibian police and the loss of his state pension and chief Liswani III gave several statements to a national newspaper and the Deputy Prime Minister -on a visit to assess emergency aid for Caprivi flood victims. He complained about the allegedly slow pace at which the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement was deciding on a number of land use applications by enterprises willing to invest in his area. The projects included ambitious schemes for water transport and irrigation, the commercial cultivation of rice and sugar cane. The chief appealed for the Deputy Premier's intervention regarding the decision-making process over what one report called Namibia's "largest and most ambitious post-independence agro investment", a €70 million bio fuel production scheme with a supposed potential to create 300 000 permanent and an additional 300 000 temporary jobs. 15 The project envisages the cultivation of altogether 50 000 hectares of what is currently communal land. Some of this land has been the subject of bitter disputes between the Subiya and the Fwe. The ministry's role is to grant final approval and endorse lease title deeds of 49 years agreed on between the Subiya's council of advisors and the foreign investor 16 . Chief Liswani complained in February 2008: "It is a lot of money that could be injected into the economy in terms of direct foreign investment, but most unfortunately the Ministry of Lands has not been very cooperative" (New Era, 28 February 2008).
Conclusion
What we see in the Namibia-Zambia borderland today are clearly not just two cases of African postcolonial state authority successfully bringing peripheral hinterlands within the realm of central state power. Powerful actors in the periphery also try to harness the state to serve their own interests. Chiefs Yeta and Liswani have been both actively lobbying their governments to set the conditions for commercial activities in their areas, and their subjects have returned the favor at the ballot boxes. The way in which the chiefs have seized upon the new opportunities offered by the current scramble for political support and profitable investments in the Namibia-Zambia borderland is remarkable, but it is not unheard of. The historical record from both sides of the borderland shows that a very similar configuration of power and mutual interests characterized the early phase of colonial intrusion in the area. It was through this mutual engagement of colonizers and chiefs that the boundary line along the Zambezi was originally transformed from an abstract claim between the colonizers into a reality of politics and daily life in the borderland. An important factor which keeps the door open for the chiefs to come into the political equation is the necessity for both governments to show that they can deliver development not just for big business, but for their citizens. In the rural areas of the former Lozi kingdom any such development cannot be accomplished without those who control the land and communicate between the state and its citizens. Yet despite their strong ties with the national leadership chiefs Yeta and Liswani are also pursuing other options. They directly negotiate with hopeful investors. This could be regarded as an attempt to by-pass government regulation and "skip the middle man". But actually, the chiefs are trying to position themselves as the middle man that cannot be by-passed. Vis á vis the investors the chiefs assume a quasigovernmental role. Vis á vis the governments they present the arguments of the prospective investor who wants to "get the job done" without friction from inefficient bureaucracy and infrastructure. Their assumed position as the middle man is grounded in the supposed legitimacy derived from representing the cultural heritage and interests of people at the grassroots. This is not unlike a tightrope walk. On the one hand, Yeta and Liswani cannot risk associating too closely with the politicians. The power base of "their sons" is much more fragile and short-lived than the chiefs' claim to represent the living link to a much older and deeper source of legitimacy. On the other hand, the chiefs cannot risk to be seen by their people as mere politicians or self-interested profiteers who sell out communal resources for a fast profit. It is the ability to find the balance on that tight rope which has kept Yeta, Liswani The official English name of the document is 'Anglo-German Agreement of 1890'. 2 The rationale for the creation of the Caprivi Strip was the same which underlay Cecil Rhodes' dream of a territorial and infrastructural connection from the Cape to Cairo, and the Portuguese attempt to establish the cross-continental link that was expressed in the "Rose-Colored Map" of 1887. 3 Mamdani explicitly includes British indirect rule, French association and South African apartheid in his concept of decentralized despotism. 4 In correspondence with other Europeans, Coillard stated clearly that he regarded British protection as the only option for stability in Bulozi and the salvation of its people, as well as a last-ditch opportunity for a favorable deal before more ruthless European forces could encroach upon the kingdom (see Mainga 1973, 178f.) . 5 This was the rationale for Seiner's expedition to the Okavango and Zambezi in 1905-06 (Seiner 1909; Fisch 1996, 16) . 6 Contemporary sources ostracized them as 'lichtscheue Weisse Elemente': 'white elements avoiding the light of day' (Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1908 , 1152 and 'weisses Gesindel -Aasjäger und direkt dem Gefängnis entsprungene Verbrecher': 'white trash -poachers and prison escapees' (Streitwolf 1911, 1) . 7 According to Streitwolf, Letia had actively spread rumors that the approaching Germans were likely to massacre the regional population. Whether Streitwolf suspected his British counterparts to have quietly supported this movement of population is unclear, as his own accounts diplomatically avoid addressing this question. It is however clear that the relocation would have increased British, and thereby Letia's hut tax revenue. 8 For example, the position of Prime Minister was reserved to a Lozi (Pettman 1974) . 9 Subiya chief Muraliswani in 1987 went to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal against Fwe chief Mamili to be recognized as "the Supreme Chief of the tribes and inhabitants of the Caprivi Zipfel". The court decided against Muraliswani (South African Supreme Court of Appeal 1989).
